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CASE NOTES
Computer Associates v. Altai and Apple v. Microsoft: Two Steps
Back From Whelan?
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, (2d Cir. 1992). Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006, (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Audrey F. Dickey*
In 1986, the Third Circuit, in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Den-
tal Laboratory,1 defined a test f6r copyright infringement of com-
puter programs that went beyond simply looking for literal copying
of the elements. The court laid the foundation for what has become
known as the "look and feel" analysis to determine substantial simi-
larity by comparing not only the literal elements, but the sequence,
structure and organization of a program. Since Whelan, many
courts have used a similar analysis for determining copyright in-
fringement of software, but in the summer of 1992, two cases were
decided that may mark the beginning of a retreat from the "look
and feel" doctrine, and may have a significant impact on the future
of computer program copyright actions. These cases are Computer
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,2 a Second Circuit case,
and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.3 from the Northern
District of California.4 Both cases criticized the approach in Whe-
lan and bring forth the question as to whether similarity in struc-
ture will continue to be sufficient to show copyright infringement in
computer software.
The courts began their analysis in both cases by looking at the
two elements needed to show infringement, access and substantial
similarity. In both cases, access was available and so the question
hinged on whether there was substantial similarity. In neither case
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was there literal copying of the elements. Although the analyses
used by the two judges appeared to be different, there were funda-
mental similarities in the treatment of the programs, looking at
them not as whole works, but at their component parts to determine
similarity. The results were also similar. In Computer Associates,
no infringement was found. In Apple v. Microsoft, summary judg-
ment was granted on 300 out of 304 alleged violations, with only
four elements found to be possible protected expression.
The facts of Computer Associates were outlined in the District
court decision.5 Computer Associates (CA) wrote a job-scheduling
program called CA-Scheduler for the IBM System 370 family of
computers. IBM sells three different operating systems for this fam-
ily, and software developers who want their programs to run on all
three must usually write three different versions in order to be con-
sistent with whatever operating system the customer might choose.
To avoid the burden of writing three versions of CA-
SCHEDULER, CA wrote one version, consisting of two parts. One
part, called SCHEDULER, performed the actual job scheduling
functions. When it needed to communicate with the operating sys-
tem, it passed control to the second part, ADAPTER. ADAPTER
provided the proper interface between SCHEDULER and the oper-
ating system and was able to communicate with any of the three
operating systems, translating the commands from SCHEDULER
to the proper format for the operating system in use. ADAPTER
was used not only in CA-SCHEDULER, but in other programs
written by CA. ADAPTER was not sold separately.
Altai attempted to market a program similar to CA-
SCHEDULER, but Altai's version was not as versatile. Their first
attempt, called ZEKE, did not have the equivalent of an
ADAPTER module, but was only able to run on one IBM operat-
ing system. Subsequently, Altai developed Oscar, their version of
ADAPTER. The first version of OSCAR, OSCAR 3.4, was written
by a former employee of CA and, it was later discovered, contained
much code that was copied directly from ADAPTER. Once it was
revealed to Altai's management that OSCAR was a possible in-
fringement on CA's program, they began efforts to rewrite OSCAR
in order to eliminate all of the copied code. It is this second version
of OSCAR, OSCAR 3.5, that is in question in this case. The argu-
ment hinged on whether Altai's OSCAR 3.5 was substantially simi-
lar to CA's program. CA claimed that despite the rewrite of
OSCAR, it was still substantially the same as ADAPTER. In the
5. Computer Associates Int'l. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 544, 549-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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decision, the court agreed with Whelan that copyright infringement
can go beyond just literal copying.6 But the court went on to say
that this did not end the analysis. Rather, the next step was to de-
termine the extent of the protection for non-literal structure.
Judge Walker then discussed the problem inherent in the idea-
expression dichotomy and the even greater difficulty in separating
the two in computer programs. Whelan was cited for its attempt to
draw the line between idea and expression, but Judge Walker then
criticized the Whelan concept of a single idea defining a program.
In the Whelan analysis, once the idea of the program is determined,
the program itself provides the expression of that idea. Judge
Walker saw this as the fatal flaw in the Whelan reasoning, the as-
sumption that only one idea could underlie any computer program.
According to Judge Walker, a program can contain many sub-pro-
grams, each with its own idea.7 Judge Walker then explained the
Second Circuit approach to determining substantial similarity, the
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test. This is a three-part test
that starts with the abstractions test first expounded by Learned
Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures.' The program is broken
down into levels of abstraction from the most complex, a collection
of instructions, to the simplest, the ultimate function of the pro-
gram. After the levels are identified, then the filtering test takes
place. Each component at each level is examined to determine
whether or not the component is protectible expression. It could be
that the module contains an idea rather than expression. If the
module is expression, that expression may be dictated by considera-
tions of efficiency, required by factors external to the program, or
taken from the public domain. Any of these reasons would cause
that component to be non-protectible.
Once the elements deemed non-protectible in the filtration pro-
cess have been sifted out, the remainder represents the "core of pro-
tected expression." 9 At this point, the court must determine if the
defendant copied any aspect of this expression. But another part of
the analysis focuses on the copied portion's relative importance to
the overall program. Thus, even if substantial similarity is found, it
may be that the similar piece is determined to be of such relatively
little importance to the overall work that no infringement would be
found. Judge Walker defended his approach as one that "not only
6. Computer Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1241, 1249.
7. Id. at 1252.
8. 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930).
9. Computer Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1241, 1256.
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comports with, but advances the constitutional policies underlying
the copyright act."10 He emphasized that the primary objective of
the copyright law is to stimulate creativity, not reward authors. He
criticized the Whelan rationale as too sweeping because it allows the
first to implement certain techniques to put a "lock" on them, re-
sulting in an inhibition of creation. He also stated his belief that
copyright is not the most suitable method of protection for com-
puter software and that the result of the decision in this case flowed
from Congressional intent, rather than the most effective way to
protect computer software. 1
In applying his test to the instant case, Judge Walker looked at
each level of abstraction in the alleged infringed program,
ADAPTER. The levels of abstraction that he found were object
code, source code, parameter lists and macros, services required,
and the general outline. At the code levels, he found no similarity
at all, since the code had been rewritten to remove the identical
code. On the level of parameter lists and macros, there were ele-
ments that were similar to protected elements, but they were
deemed insignificant compared to the overall program. The list of
services required were found to be determined by the demands of
the operating system, and the organizational charts were considered
to be simple and obvious, following naturally from the work's
theme.12 Thus, no infringement was found.
Apple's suit against Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard (HP) in-
volved the immensely successful Windows software by Microsoft,
which sits on the DOS 3 operating system and extends its visual and
graphical capabilities. Apple also uses a graphical interface for its
Macintosh line of computers. In 1985, in an attempt to put to rest
arguments as to whether Windows infringed on Apple's copyright
for its Macintosh operating system, Apple granted to Microsoft a
non-exclusive license for the audiovisual displays in the first version
of Windows, Windows 1.0. In turn, Microsoft had given HP a li-
cense for some of the displays used in Windows that HP had incor-
porated into their software called NewWave. However, these
licenses covered only the displays found in Windows 1.0 and did
not cover those that first appeared in a subsequent release, Windows
2.03. Apple filed suit against Microsoft and HP for infringing on
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1257.
12. Id. at 1260.
13. This is a Microsoft trademarked acronym for Disc Operating System.
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those copyrights of elements not covered by the 1985 agreement. 14
Apple attempted to base its suit on the similarity of the overall look
of Windows and NewWave to the Apple Macintosh graphical inter-
face which Apple later described as a "desk-top metaphor.""5 In
1985, the court did not accept Apple's "look and feel" argument
and requested that Apple submit a list of the alleged similarities
between the Macintosh displays the Windows and NewWave. Ap-
ple's list contained 189 alleged similarities-between the Apple works
and Windows and 147 similarities between the Apple displays and
NewWave. 16 Microsoft and HP filed motions for summary judg-
ment, claiming no infringement on a variety of grounds. The court
determined that 179 of the similarities claimed in Windows17 and
135 in NewWave18 were covered by the 1985 license. A subsequent
decision determined that the ten remaining items relating to Win-
dows and 53 out 54 of the NewWave items were subject to little or
no copyright protection and summary judgment was granted to
Microsoft and HP on those 63 items.19 Apple moved for reconsid-
eration and this decision is the result of that reconsideration. In this
case, Judge Walker used the two-part test of the Ninth Circuit for
determining copyright infringement. This test starts with an extrin-
sic, or objective, analysis of the work using expert testimony to de-
termine criteria for comparison.20 During this stage of the analysis
not only is similarity of ideas determined, but the elements that can
be protected by copyright must be identified. This is similar to the
filtering step used by Judge John Walker in the Computer Associates
decision. Once the protectible elements are determined, an "intrin-
sic test" or "subjective analysis of expression"21 is used. This part
of the test is performed not by the court, but by the trier of fact.
However, should the extrinsic analysis result in no protectible ele-
ments of the work, then the intrinsic test is unnecessary and sum-
mary judgment is appropriate.22
Judge Walker then went on to describe the doctrines that
would cause an element to be deemed unprotectible, that is, merger,
14. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F.Supp. 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
15. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
16. Id. at 1016.
17. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F.Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
18. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F.Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
19. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 WL 75423 (N.D. Cal. 1992)..
20. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
21. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357.
22. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006, 1020 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
19931
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNTAL
indispensable expression (scenes a faire), idea rather than expres-
sion, and lack of originality. According to Judge Walker, courts
have developed these limiting doctrines as a response to the prob-
lem of balancing between the revenue and cost effects inherent in
copyright protection. Although copyright affords an incentive to
authors by allowing them to recoup their investment in creativity, it
also increases the costs of creation by keeping that creative work the
exclusive property of one author.23
Apple argued that in order to understand the appearance of the
Macintosh interface one must look not only at the individual ele-
ments, but the way those elements interact with one another. Thus,
the "look and feel" doctrine could be used to compare the overall
appearance of the Macintosh with Windows and NewWave. How-
ever, Judge Walker rejected this argument, saying that the desktop
metaphor was not the idea unifying the expressive elements, but
rather merely "a collection of visual displays and user commands
designed to render use of the computer.., more utilitarian."24 He
saw the elements as performing a purely functional purpose, and
likened the display and commands to the various parts of an auto-
mobile. No copyright protection is available for utilitarian
articles. 25
The court then went on to criticize the Whelan court for its
formulation that a program's overall purpose constitutes the idea
and that the program itself is the expression of that idea. According
to the law of the Ninth Circuit, a program can contain many ideas.
Judge Walker also pointed to the 1985 agreement as proof that Ap-
ple and Microsoft accepted the individual displays as the protectible
expression, not the totality of the programs.26 Having explained his
approach to the problem, Judge Walker then proceeded to analyze
each of the displays in question. He had granted summary judg-
ment to Microsoft on its claims of non-infringement for all ten re-
maining items in his previous decision. In this reconsideration, he
affirmed his previous decision on all items. Previously HP was
granted summary judgment for all but one claim, the trash can
icon.
In the instant decision, Judge Walker reconsidered and
changed his decision of three items dealing with the appearance of
icons as windows are opening and closing, as well as reaffirming the
23. Id. at 1021.
24. Id. at 1023.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1025.
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protectibility of the trash can icon.2 7 In determining the protec-
tibility or non-protectibility of the elements in question, Judge
Walker used the limiting doctrines mentioned above. Microsoft
and HP were able to show that before and during the development
of Lisa, the predecessor to the Macintosh, the Apple development
engineers were exposed to other graphical interface systems, and
that Apple incorporated into their products some of the ideas that
they obtained from observing these other systems. The defendants
also showed that the other graphical user interfaces on the market
always incorporate the basic elements of the Macintosh interface.
Due to these two arguments, many of the contested elements were
found to be non-protectible because of either lack of originality or
indispensable expression. In addition, some elements were found to
contain not expression but ideas.
In both cases, the courts were critical of the Whelan approach
which treats a program as the expression of a single idea. The
courts in these two decisions also used similar methods of breaking
the program down into many elements and "filtering out" non-pro-
tectible elements, making a case for "look and feel" much more dif-
ficult to support. The role of sequence, structure and organization,
the foundation of the "look and feel" doctrine, played little or no
part in the analysis by concentrating on the parts rather than the
whole.
However, one should not draw a conclusion from these cases
that "look and feel" is dead. *In each case, unique factors existed
that may not be present in other software copyright cases. In Com-
puter Associates, the program's function was narrowly defined by
the application. Judge John Walker based much of his decision on
non-protectibility on the reason that the element was required by
factors external to the program. It has been well known in the in-
dustry that Apple's development engineers acquired many of their
ideas for the Lisa, the forerunner of the Macintosh, from systems
that they saw at Xerox. It was not surprising, then, that Judge
Vaughn Walker leaned heavily on the limiting doctrine of lack of
originality in reaching his decision. Should the next software case
contain none of these unique factors, it may be that the decision will
heartily support the Whelan approach. We will have to wait and
see.
Judge John Walker, in discussing the policy considerations
leading to his decision, described his dilemma as follows:
27. Apple, 799 F.Supp. at 1042.
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To be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for non-
literal program structure are not completely clear. We trust that
as future cases are decided, those limits will become better de-
fined... Generally, we think that copyright registration - with
its indiscriminating availability - is not ideally suited to deal
with the highly dynamic technology of computer science. Thus
far, many of the decision in this area reflect the courts' attempt to
fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole. 28
The law of software copyright is constantly changing. These two
decisions could be two steps in a totally different direction, or they
could be merely a detour along the road we have been following for
six years. Only time and the courts will tell.
28. Computer Associates, at 1257.
386 [Vol. 9
